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Compensating Organ Donors: Commodification or
Freedom?
The Commonwealth government has today announced a ‘grant’ scheme for live
organ donors. The scheme will pay live organ donors the minimum wage for six
weeks following donation, with the aim of supporting them financially.
Such a decision is likely to ignite the debate over the morality of payment for
'transactions' involving the human body. There are two sides to this debate: the
risk of commodification of the human; and the freedom and autonomy of donors
to choose how they deal with their body.
One of the perceived risks in providing payment for organ or tissue donation is
that the human body is commodified, or that it somehow becomes property. This
fundamentally conflicts with widely regarded notions of dignity in the human.
In fact for this reason, the common law tends to operate from a presumption that
there is no property in the human body. Having said this, the courts have often
steered around this, finding a ‘quasi-property’ or a ‘right to possession’ in a
human body (including a corpse) or its parts.
Altruism seems preferred as a basis for giving tissue or organs. For example, blood
donations in Australia are an important part of our health care system, but donors
are not paid - in contrast to other jurisdictions. 
The foundation of the commodification argument can be explained with reference
to philosopher Immanuel Kant. He argues that it is immoral to treat humans as
means to an end. Rather humans must be treated as ends in themselves. On this
argument, payment for donation of body tissue or organs may be interpreted by
some as using a human as a means to an end - thereby breaking a fundamental
moral code.
That the ‘grant’ is nominal is likely to be an important aspect of the government's
decision. Allowing compensation is seen as an acceptable boundary to the
morality of payment, avoiding the issue of financial profit from the arrangement.
This is the basis on which altruistic surrogacy arrangements permit reimbursement
of the birth mother's costs, but prohibit 'payment, reward or other material
benefit or advantage'.
There is an associated perceived risk with payment, in the capacity for
exploitation of donors. This argument posits that if financial gain is permitted, the
'rich' will be able to buy their way to a new organ, taking advantage of the 'poor'.
Exploitation seems less likely to occur if payment is limited to mere compensation.
On the other hand, others argue that people should be able to deal with their
bodies as they see fit as an expression of their bodily autonomy and freedom -
including freedom to contract.
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In contrast to the Kantian notion that the donor is merely a means to an end
(the end being the health of the recipient), the bodily autonomy argument
suggests that the donation is an expression of dignity through the exercise of
free choice over the use of the donor's own body.
This is a liberal approach to the issue, and tends to be argued also in the context
of an economic argument. Economics would suggest that the market mechanism
is the most efficient means of allocation of scarce resources (including human
tissue and organs). Monetary incentives (profit, rather than compensation) would
drive the market. Similarly, it is suggested that within a market, those most able
to bear the cost of donation (both physically and financially) will be those who
participate.  
While the government's announcement occurs within the context of this debate,
there is likely to be a pragmatic system-wide reason behind the decision - namely
that the health costs of supporting those waiting for an organ donation will be
reduced if more organ transplants occur. In this way, the grants may be cheaper
than the alternative and benefit on a large scale. This contrasts with the more
individual analysis of commodification and individual freedom.
On balance, this decision could well represent a step that helps to break a stand-
off between these two arguments. If well implemented with full regard for the
dignity and autonomy of the donors and their recipients, this decision could lead
the way for policy advances in many presently-contested areas of health and
bio-ethics. 
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